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OF APPEALS

PAULETTE STAGG
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE #500
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114
Re:

Tracey J. Florence v. Dept. of Workforce Services
Case No. 20000700-CA

Dear Ms. Stagg:
Oral argument in the above-referenced case was heard Thursday, March 22.2001
by a panel consisting of Judges Orme, Jackson, and Greenwood. At the oral argument and in the
Petitioner's Reply Brief, the issue was raised concerning the legal authority of a U.S. Department
of Labor Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (UIPL) which was part of the original record
and the basis for the final agency action of Respondent Workforce Appeals Board.
After receiving the Petitioner's Reply Brief, and prior to the scheduled oral
argument, Respondent contacted the U.S. Department of Labor for clarification on the legal
authority of it's UIPLs. Their reply was faxed to us on March 21, 2001, the day before oral
argument. Respondent attempted to proffer this reply and clarification during oral argument, but
was unsure how to proceed. Respondent desires to draw the Court's attention to this authority
which appears to dispose of the issue. Please accept this new evidence as part of the record.
Briefly, the reply from the U.S. Department of Labor advises all state employment
agencies of its position that UIPLs and other Departmental directives do, in fact, have legal
authority.
If you have any questions about these matters, please contact me at 526-9637.
Very truly yours,

Lorin R. Blauer
Legal Counsel
Department of Workforce Services
rs
enclosures
cc:
Michael E. Bulson. Attorney for Petitioner
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The Legal Authority of Unemployment Insurance
Program Lettere and Similar Directives

1. Purpose. To advise States of the position of the Department
of Labor (Department) regarding the legal authority for
Unemployment Insurance Program Letters (UlPLs) and other
Departmental directives which affect the Federal-state
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Program.
2. References. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) , 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559; the Social Security Act (SSA); and the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) «
3. Background. Departmental directives for the UI program
include UIPLs, General Administration Letters (GALs), Handbooks,
the Employment Security Manual (ESM) and various transmittals of
model legislation for implementing Federal law requirements.
These directives are issued to the States under authority
delegated by the Secretary of Labor,
The Department issues directives to set forth official agency
policy. These directives state or clarify the Department's
position, particularly with respect to the Department's
interpretation of the minimum Federal requirements for conformity
or compliance, thereby assuring greater uniformity of application
of such requirements by the States. Oftentimes these directives
provide information in the public interest which is vital to
guiding the states' courses of operations.
States have raised questions regarding what weight these
directives carry as interpretations of Federal law. These
inquiries have come from state legislators, state Attorney
General offices, other State officials and attorneys in Legal
Services. It has sometimes been argued that, since the
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- 2interpretations in these directives are not found in the Code of
Federal Regulations, they have no lagal effaot. This UIPL is
issued to advise States that these directives do, in fact, have
legal effect•
4. Diflcrugflion, Ths APA contains requirements to determine which
rules are subject to its notice and comment procedures
(ultimately leading to publication in the Code of Federal
Regulations) to have force and effect as well as provisions for
those rules which are not subject to those procedures* The APA,
originally enacted on June 11, 1946, and later revised by P.L.
89-554, (5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559) was passed in part to assist the
various Federal government agencies in their administration of
statutes under their jurisdiction. The APA recognizes that some
functions and some operations of Federal agencies do not lend
themselves to a formal procedure. For this reason, the APA
provides for different types of rules including "substantive" or
"legislative" rules and "interpretative" rules. Section 553(b)
of the APA, which requires that a general notice of proposed rule
making must be published in the Federal Register, makes two
exceptions to this requirement, one of which is relevant here as
follows:
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this
*ub*action does not apply-*
'
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice;
The test for determining if a rule is interpretative, and thus
not subject to the requirement of a published notice of proposed
rulemaking, is found in Gibson Wine Co., Inc. v. Snvder et. al.,
134 F,2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1952) * In Gibson, the court addressed an
interpretative ruling transmitted by the Deputy Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service. The court stated on page 331:
Administrative officials frequently announce their
views as to the meaning of statutes or regulations.
Generally
speaking, it seems to be established that
M
regulations," "substantive rules" or "legislative
rules" are those which create law, usually iraplementary
to an existing law; whereas Interpretative rules are
statements as to what the administrative officer thinks
thft n*atM+.A nr- T-f*cm\at-inr> wMna. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under QihfiDn, an interpretative rule is one which explains or
defines particular terms in a statute or is an opinion of an
official, having authority on a particular subject, as to tho
meaning of a statute or regulation. Idt at 331-332.
British Caledonian Airwave. Ltd, v. C.A.B.. 584 F.2d 982 (D.C.
Cir. 1378), is a leading case concerning the use of
interpretative rules. The court stated that the agency was
"construing the language and intent of the existing statute and
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regulations in order to • . • remove uncertainty wwhich is "a
function peculiarly within the ability and expertise of the
agency.» Id. at 991, The agency's actions were entirely
appropriate "to illuminate the meaning" of its regulations. Id,
at 993. Another court has stated that, when interpretative rules
reiterate or explain an explicit statutory obligation, they can
even help "malee sense" of inconsistent statutory direction
created by acts of Congress as long as they do not impoaa a new
procedure or obligation which is not derived from the language of
the statute or regulation. ^ A H ^ H wopm-irai HflflaciatioTi v.
Bowen. 640 F. Supp. 453, 460 (D*D.C. 1986).
In GabaiB v. Eager, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C, Cir. 1982), the court held
that a CTIPL was not subject to th* APA notice and comment
procedures when it-construed the language and intent of a statute
and reminded States of existing duties, and where the UIPL did
not grant or deny rights nor impose obligations which did not
already exist in statute.1
Even if an interpretative rule has a wide ranging effect or a
"substantial impact" on individuals, this does not mean it is
subject to notice and comment procedures. Following the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)
that courts are generally not free to impose on agencies
requirements that exceed those required by the APA, courts have
rejected the "substantial impactM test. 3eq Cabais, 690 F.2d at
237-238); Rivera v. Becerra. 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983). The
B£z§ia court, which specifically addressed UIPLs, stated that
agencies are not required to comply with a notice and comment
procedure for interpretative rules which have a substantial
effect because Congress considered the matter and explicitly
excepted interpretative rules and general statements of policy
from this procedure. Id. at 890-891* The court observed that
agencies now freely issue interpretative rules as guidance and
that unnecessarily restrictive procedures should not be imposed
beyond that contemplated by the APA. id.
5* Action Requires. State Administrators are requested to
provide the above information to the appropriate staff•
6. Inquiries.
Office.

Direct questions to the appropriate Regional

l

The Csibaiq court did, however, conclude that, in one area,
a UIPL did create a substantive rule since, contrary to the broad
latitude granted to the states in the statute, the UIPL imposed
"an obligation on the States not found in the statute itself."
14^ at 239.
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